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(II)
(A)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Claimant is a 26-year employee of UPS who suffered a large L4-5 disc herniation on

his "Employer's premises" on 12.18.09 when he bent over to tie the laces on his work boots as
required by his Employer's safety policies. Employer did not dispute that the Claimant suffered
an "accident" and "injury" that occurred "in the course" of his employment. Employer denied

The Referee who presided over the 9.28.10 151 bifurcated Hearing held that Claimant's
injury occurred on his Employer's premises, properly applied the "premises presumption" and
ruled that

Claimant's accident and injury "arose out of" his employment "as a matter of law"

because Employer
wrote

premises presumption.

to
s
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and concluded without citing any evidence

the record that Employer had come forward with

sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption.
The Commission then accepted Employer's invitation to use this claim as a test case and
reviewed 80 + years of "arose out of' employment case law in an effort to convince this Court
that it should overrule its rejection of the "greater risk" doctrine in Spivey v. Novartis Seed, 137
Idaho 29, 43 P.3d 788 (2002). After analyzing all of the "greater risk" cases, the Commission
correctly ruled that Claimant had met his burden of proving an accident and injury that "arose
out of' his employment without even applying the premises presumption and awarded the
Claimant medical benefits and total temporary disability benefits.
Employer refused to comply with the Commission's decision and refused to pay benefits
Instead, Employer filed its 1st interlocutory appeal. This Court dismissed Employer's appeal
based on Jensen v. Pillsbury, 121 Idaho 127, 823 P.2d 161 (1992). Employer then asked the
Commission to stay enforcement of its Order. The Commission denied Employer's request for a
stay. Employer attempted its 2nd interlocutory appeal. This Court dismissed it. After Employer's
2nd attempt to take an interlocutory appeal failed, Employer finally paid Claimant some of the
benefits that he was entitled to receive under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act in this
compensable claim.
The Commission held its final bifurcated hearing over
on 5.1 7.12 and

was totally and permanently disabled as an odd-lot
to
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extent of Claimant's disability

100%

and

6

disability benefits. Employer filed its
the Commission.

3rd

Claimant

appeal and asked this Court to reverse both decisions
ISIF cross-appealed.

Employer's decision to use this claim as a test case to convince this Court that it should
overrule its rejection of the "greater risk" doctrine in Spivey has unreasonably deprived the
Claimant and his family of the "sure and certain" relief that they were promised by the Idaho
Workers' Compensation Act and replaced that relief with 4-5 years of vexatious litigation that
has resulted in 2 bifurcated Hearings before the Industrial Commission and 3 Employer
sponsored appeals to the Supreme Court.

(B)

THE rouJ~SE O_F Tij:E PROCEEDINGS
Employer filed its Motion To Bifurcate on 5.12.10 (R., Vol. I, pp. 11-14). Referee

Michael Powers held the first bifurcated Hearing in this case on 9.28.10 and entered his proposed
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation to the Commission on 4.20.11 (R.,
Vol. I, pp. 20-31). When the Commission re-wrote Referee Powers' proposed decision, the
Commission found that "the subject accident occurred on Employer's premises" (R., Vol. I, p.
36, LI. 15-16), but applied the wrong legal standard based on its misreading of Kessler on Beha(f

of Kessler v. Payette County, 129 Idaho 855, 934 P.2d 28 (1997) and I.R.E. 301 and erroneously
concluded without citation to any evidence in the record that Employer had come forward with
sufficient evidence to rebut
declaring

General

premises presumption (R., Vol. I, p.
vUJL<J>.-.:>

presumption rule from Foust
616 (1967) "moot",

9

out
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case

. 23-25).
V.

Birds Eye Division of

Commission
to a I

7

Court case.

After discussing the 3 categories of risk

hypothetical "arise out

might be applicable to different

employment scenarios, the Commission then cited this Court's

holding in Spivey v. Novartis Seed, Inc., 137 Idaho 29, 43 P. 3d 788 (2002) and ruled m
Claimant's favor on the "arose out of' employment question:
In summary, we find that the risk of injury at issue in the instant matter is likely not a
neutral risk, but, instead, a risk of injury that bears a causal connection to the
work that Claimant was hired to perform.... To the extent that the longstanding
rule explained in Eriksen v. Nez Perce County, supra, is to the contrary, we perceive
that rule is overruled by Spivey. Quite apart from the question of whether or not
Claimant is entitled to a presumption favoring the compensability of this claim,
the evidence establishes that Claimant has satisfied his burden of proving the
occurrence of an accident both arising out and in the course of employment"
(R., Vol. I, p. 49, L. 24-p. 50, L. 7) (emphasis supplied).
The Commission awarded the Claimant TTD benefits during his period of recovery and
100% of the invoiced amount of the denied past medical benefit claims that had been adjudicated
as Claimant's EX. 7 at the 9 .28 .10 Hearing, but denied Claimant's request for attorney's fees in
this close case because the Commission felt that this Court's holding in Spivey is the subject of
legitimate debate (R., Vol. I, p. 51, L. 21 - p. 52, L. 5)

1
.

On 5.19.11 the Claimant filed his 2nd Request For Calendaring of the remaining disputed
issues in this case (R., Vol. I, pp. 54-56). The Commission could not schedule the final hearing
because Employer filed its Notice of Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court on 6.20.11 (R., Vol., I,
pp. 69-71).

Claimant filed a Motion

granted the

Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal and the Supreme

s Motion To Dismiss

Dismissing Employer's

pp. 74-75).

on 7.27. 1

1

The Claimant strongly disagrees with the Commission's
that
and the Commission to
argues that stare decisis requires all

Brief

remains the
of legitimate debate and
apply this Cou1i's holding in Spivey.

8

Court's 7.27.11 Order Dismissing

Employer then filed a
Appeal which this

denied on 8.15.11 after directing Employer's attention to

Court's

holding in Jensen v. Pillsbury Co, 121 Idaho 127, 823 P2d 161 (1992) (R., Vol. I, p. 76).
Employer then filed a Notice of Intent to File a Workers' Compensation Complaint Against The
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund on 8.18.11 (R. Vol. I, pp. 77-79) and a Complaint against the
ISIF on 10.19.11 (R., Vol. II, pp. 190-191).
Employer mocked the Industrial Commission's legal authority in its 9 .16.11
Memorandum Regarding Payment Obligations (R., Vol. I, p. 91-169) by pointing out that the
Commission had "no statutory authority to enforce its own awards" (R., Vol. I, p. 94, LL 1213) (emphasis supplied). The Claimant filed his Response to Defendants' Motion For Stay of
5.17.11 Order To Pay Compensation Benefits on 9.27.12 and asked the Commission to Order
Employer to make prompt payment of all benefits due (R., Vol. II, pp. 170-187).
On 12.8.11, the Industrial Commission entered its Order Denying Stay and ordered

Employer to promptly pay to the Claimant all medical and TTD benefits previously awarded to
Claimant in the Commission's 5.17.11 decision plus statutory interest within 14 days from the
date of the Commission's 12. 8.11 Order (R., Vol. II, pp. 204-214). The Commission reminded

not be in

Employer that "[iJnjured workers

position of having to

issues

to

lS

note

to

Brief
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of any surety who unnecessarily delays payment of compensation" (R., Vol.

209,

23 - p.

210, Ll).
Finally, the Commission reminded Employer that "[t]he policy of the workers'
compensation law is to provide injured workers with sure and certain relief.

Claimant is

correct that an important aspect of sure and certain relief is prompt payment of benefits.
Claimant's compensation payments should not be delayed for months or years because of a

voluntary request for bifurcation made by Defendants. There is no manifest injustice or due
process violation in ordering Defendants to pay an award granted by the bifurcated decision that

they themselves requested" (R., Vol. II, p. 211, LL 4-9).
Although Employer had mocked the Industrial Commission's authority and refused to
comply with its 5.17.11 Order, the Commission ruled in its 12.8.11 Order that the Claimant was
not entitled to an award of attorney's fees for Employer's unreasonable delay in the payment of
benefits because Employer had filed a Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court and had asked the
Commission to stay enforcement of its 5.17.11 Order (R., Vol. II, p. 212).
After Employer received the Commission's 12.8.11 Order compelling the prompt
payment of benefits, Employer again refused to comply with the Commission's Order and filed a
Motion

Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court (R., Vol.
Employer's Motion on 12.19.11 (R., Vol.

1.30.12,

237-239). However, on

Court entered its
remammg

Claimant/

pp. 215 -217). The

Brief

case
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After more than 2 years of unreasonable denials and contentious litigation, Employer
finally complied with the Industrial Commission's 5.17.11 Order and 12.8.11

and made

the unconditional payment of the past denied medical benefits that had been adjudicated at the
9.28.10 Hearing as CL. EX. 7 and the retroactive TTD benefits that had accrued from 12.28.09 12.6.10 (CL. 5.17.12 EX. 17, 017022; 017025).
After making that unconditional payment of past due benefits, Employer then engaged in
a very disingenuous legal maneuver and raised the doctrine of res judicata to justify its
continuing refusal to pay Claimant the following benefits:
1.

100% of the invoiced amount of all past denied medical benefit claims that were incurred
by Claimant in connection with his 12.18.09 injury but noJ adjudicated as EX. 7 at the
9.28.10 Hearing (CL. 5.17.12 EX. 14 and EX. 15); and,

2.

100% of all past denied mileage, per diem and lodging benefits that were not adjudicated
at the 9.28.10 Hearing (CL. 5.17.12 EX. 16).
The Commission's 3. 7 .12 Notice of Hearing set the remaining disputed issues in this case

for Hearing on 5.17.12 (R., Vol. II, pp. 258-260). On 9.28.12, the Commission entered its final
decision on the remaining disputed issues in this case and held that:
(1)

The Claimant was totally and permanently disabled as an odd-lot worker;

(2)

The Claimant was entitled to a 19% whole person PPI rating with 12% of that rating
being assigned to the Claimant's 12.18.09 low back injury and 7% being apportioned
back to the Claimant's 10.22.90 low back injury;

(3)

The 7% whole person
rating that Dr.
issued on 3.10.11 and
applied
to the Claimant's 10.22.90 low back inj
met all of the
retroactively 21-years
elements
the PFC against the
but
ISIF was not liable for any of the
is estopped from
Claimant's total and permanent
benefits because
asserting
inconsistent

Brief
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is liable for 100%
the Claimant's total and permanent disability benefits
beginning when the Claimant achieved maximum medical improvement
November of 2010;
(5)

Based on this Court's holding in Neel v. Western Construction, 147 Idaho 146, 206 P.3d
852 (2009), Employer is liable for the payment of 100% of the invoiced amount of .ci:ll of
the Claimant's past denied medieal benefits with proper credit for the amounts previously
paid on or about 2.6.12 based on the medical bills that were adjudicated as CL. EX. 7 at
the 9.28.10 Hearing;

(6)

Employer could ;tlQ_t use the doctrine of res judicata to avoid its Neel obligation to pay
Claimant 100% of the invoiced amount of all past denied medical benefits that were
incurred by Claimant in connection with his 12.18.09 industrial accident;

(7)

Based on this Court's holding in Neel, Employer was liable for the payment of 100% of
~ll past denied mileage, per diem and lodging expenses itemized in Claimant's 5.17.12
EX. 16; and

(8)

Employer was liable for the payment of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804
based on Employer's unreasonable refusal to pay the Claimant all undisputed worker's
compensation benefits after the Idaho Supreme Court entered its 1.30.12 Order
dismissing Employer's 2nct premature appeal (R., Vol. II, pp. 269-316).
Employer filed its Motion For Reconsideration of the Commission's 9.28.12 decision on

10.17.12 (R., Vol. II, pp. 338-349). Defendant ISIF opposed Employer's 10.17.12 Motion For
Reconsideration on 10.30.12 (R., Vol. II, pp. 350-354). Claimant opposed Employer's 10.17.12
Motion For Reconsideration on 10.30.12 (R., Vol. III, pp. 355-376).
The Industrial Commission granted Employer's Motion For Reconsideration on 12.10.12
the following

to

9.28.12 decision (as amended on 12.5.12):

(1)

Claimant I
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(2)

The Claimant's award of attorney's
now
to Employer's
unreasonable refusal to pay Claimant his undisputed 12% whole person
benefit
award after the Supreme Court dismissed Employer's 2nd premature appeal on 1.30.12
(R., Vol. III, pp. 443-461).
On 12.19.12, the Claimant filed his Motion For Reconsideration of the Commission's

12.l 0.12 Order on Reconsideration and asked the Commission to reconsider its application of

collateral estoppel because Employer failed to prove all of the elements in the prima facie case
(R., Vol. III, pp. 462-497). The Commission summarily denied the motion without discussion
even though the doctrine of collateral estoppel was not listed in the Commission's 3.7.12 Notice
of Hearing; was not raised as an affirmative defense by Employer at the commencement of the
5.17.12 Hearing when the parties agreed Employer was relying exclusively on the doctrine of

res judicata; not raised by the Claimant in his 7.27 .12 post-hearing Brief; not raised by Employer
in its 8.15.12 post-hearing Reply Brief and never even discussed by the Industrial Commission in
its original 9.28.12 decision (R., Vol. III., pp. 504-506).
Employer then filed its

3rd

appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court on 1.18.13 (R., Vol. III,

pp. 507-512). The Claimant filed his Notice of Cross-Appeal on 2.1.13 and asked the Court to
decide other disputed issues that arose during the evolution of this case but had not been raised
by Employer's 1.18.13 Notice of Appeal (R., Vol. III. pp. 516-525). Defendant ISIF filed its
of Cross Appeal on 2.4.13 (R., Vol.

pp. 529-532) and asked the Court to address 3

case are not

Claimant I Respondent's Brief
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12.17.10

2,

9). Employer denied this claim based
UPS. Since the material

facts in this case are not in dispute and all of

issues presented on appeal are legal questions,

the Claimant will not set forth a detailed statement of facts but will cite to the facts in the record
when necessary to support the Claimant's legal arguments on the disputed issues
(III)
1.

2

•

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Has Employer met its burden of proving that the Commission's 5.17.11 decision should
be reversed based on the standards ofldaho Code §72-732?
Has Employer met its burden of proving that the Commission's 12.5.12 decision should
be reversed based on the standards of Idaho Code §72-732?
Has Claimant met his burden of proving that the Commission's 12.10.12 Order On
Reconsideration should be reversed based on the standards ofldaho Code §72-732?
Should the Court award the Claimant attorney's fees at every stage of this "close case"
from date of injury on 12.18.09 to the date of final decision by the Supreme Court and on
remand pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804, I.AR. 35(a)(2) and I.A.R. 41?

2.
3.
4.

(D)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court has defined the standards of review which govern appeals from the Industrial
Commission decisions as follows:
The Court may set aside an order or award by the Industrial Commission if: (1) the
commission's findings of fact are not based on any substantial competent evidence;
(2) the commission has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its powers; (3) the
findings of fact, order or award were procured by fraud; or (4) the findings of fact do
not as a matter of law support the order or award. LC. § 72-732; Ewins v. Allied Sec.,
138 Idaho 343, 345-346, 63
469, 471-472 (2003). This Court exercises free
review over the Commission's legal conclusions but does not disturb factual findings
that are supported by substantial
evidence. Ewins, 13 8 Idaho at 346,
63 P.3d at 472. "Substantial evidence is
evidence that a reasonable mind
Court views all facts and
prevailed before
950
1254, 1256
2

The background facts which support the Commission's findings of fact and conclusions of law on the "accident" and "injury"
issues can be located at pp. 3-7 of CL. I .19. l 0 Br.

Claimant I
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(1998) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 145
Idaho 302, 305, 179 P.3d. 265, 268 (2008).

(E)
1.

THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE COMMISSION'S ERRONEOUS
CONCLUSION THAT EMPLOYER PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
REBUT THE PREMISES PRESUMPTION AND RULE THAT CLAIMANT'S
ACCIDENT AND INJURY AROSE OUT OF HIS EMPLOYMENT AS A MATTER OF
LAW
The Industrial Commission found in this case that there was no question that the

Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident and injury occurred on his Employer's premises:
There is no question that Claimant's normal workplace (other than in his truck) was
at Arnold's Aviation at the Cascade Airport in Cascade. We find that for purposes of
this matter, the subject accident occurred on Employer's premises. (R., Vol. I, p. 36,
LL 14-16).
Employer did no! appeal this finding or the Commission's ruling that the premises
presumption applied to this case. Referee Powers applied the correct legal standard from Foust v.

Birds Eye Div., 91Idaho418, 419, 422 P.2d 616, 617 (1967) for what the Employer must prove
to rebut the premises presumption and correctly held that Employer failed to rebut the "premises
presumption":
Claimant is entitled to the presumption that his injury arose in the course of and out
of his employment. Therefore, the burden shifts to Employer to rebut that
presumption by proving Claimant's accident and injury did not arise out of his
employment because it was an abnormal, unforeseeable activity that was foreign to
his employment. See, Foust Id. (R., Vol. I, p. 24, 20-p.25,
Commission re-wrote Referee

decision, it misread

to
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Therefore, in order to overcome the presumption that the accident is one arising out
of and in the course of employment, Defendant must come forward with proof
sufficient to permit reasonable minds to conclude that the accident is not one arising
out of and in the course of employment. If the opposing pai1y does come forward
with such evidence, then the Commission must ascertain whether the facts are
sufficient to demonstrate that the accident is one arising out of and in the course of
employment without the benefit of the presumption. (R., Vol. I, p. 37, LL 17-22).
Even if the Court assumed arguendo that that the Kessler Court's reference to I.R.E. 301
negated this Court's holding in Foust and lowered the standard of proof for what is required to
rebut the "premises presumption" (which the Claimant does not concede), by its express terms
I.R.E. 301 only applies in those cases where the presumption rebuttal standard is not otherwise
provided for by Idaho appellate decisions.
The Foust rule is directly on point and has always defined the proper standard of proof that
is required for Employer to rebut the "premises presumption":
A contrary presumption, that is, that the injury arises out of and in the course of
employment, prevails where the injury occurs on the employer's premises, as in the
instant case and Nichols v. Godfrey, supra. (citations omitted). In the case at bar
there is nothing to indicate that respondent, while on her employer's premises, was
engaged in any abnormal unforeseeable activity foreign to her employment, as was
the situation in In re Malmquist, 78 Idaho 117, 300 P .2d 820 (1956); Neale v.
Weaver, 60 Idaho 41, 88 P.2d 522 (1939); and Walker v. Hyde, 43 Idaho 625, 253 P.
1104 (1927). Foust v. Birds Eye Div., 91Idaho418, 419, 422 P.2d 616, 617 (1967).

This Court has recently construed the premises presumption rule stated in Kessler, I.R.E.
301 and Foust as being perfectly consistent:
When an injury occurs on an employer's premises, a
arises that the
injury arose out of and in the course
129 Idaho at 859, 934
P.2d at 32 (1997); Foust v. Birds Eye Div., 91
418, 419,
P.2d 616, 617
(1967). Stevens-McAtee v. Potlatch Corp.,
325,
288, 296
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A mere 6 months after the Commission refused to apply the Foust rule in this case, the
Commission correctly

that

defines what the Employer must prove to rebut

premises presumption:
An accident involving a worker occurring on the employer's premises is presumed to
arise out of and in the course of employment. Foust v. Birds Eye Division of General
Foods Com., 91 Idaho 418, 422 P.2d 616 (1967). This presumption can be rebutted
by proof that the employee, while on the employer's premises, was engaged in
unforeseeable, abnormal activity foreign to his employment. Mudge v. GNP of
Idaho, Inc., and Tower Insurance Company of New York, 2011 WL 6042994, LC.
No. 2010-025109, p. 7, L. 32-p. 8, L. 1 (Filed: 11.14.11).
Even if this Court were to ignore the Commission's adoption of the Foust standard in

Afudge and apply the lower standard that the Commission used in this case, this Court should
still reverse the Commission's finding that Employer rebutted the presumption because no
reasonable person could conclude, based on the evidence presented, that Employer came forward
with proof sufficient to permit reasonable minds to conclude that the accident is not one arising
out of and in the course of employment.
The Claimant gave unrefuted testimony at the 9.28.10 Hearing which explained how
Employer's Safety Policies required him to tie the laces on his work boots (Tr. 1, p. 17, L. 22 p. 23, L. 19). Michael McGuire is Employer's Health and Safety Manager for the Northwest
District who, by his own estimate, is one of the top 20 people in the entire UPS organization of
430,000 employees who is qualified to discuss UPS's Safety Policies (McGuire 9.16.10 prehearing Dep.,

1

10).
during
to

Claimant/ Respondent's Brief

9 .16.10 pre-hearing deposition

on

boots

to

!7

mmnmze

getting

risk of trip and fall injuries and prevent "loose or hanging"

caught in moving parts or machinery (McGuire 9 .16. l 0 Dep., p. 24, L-9 -

52,

15; Dep.

E, p. 4 and CL. 9.28.10 EX. 11, 011015-011016).
Preston Dax Wilkinson was the Claimant's Supervisor and Business Manager (Tr. 1, p. 84,
LI. 18-19). Mr. Wilkinson gave unrefuted testimony at the 9.28.10 Hearing confirming that he
had read all of Mr. McGuire's 9 .16.10 pre-hearing deposition transcript and agreed 100°1<> with
all of Mr. McGuire's testimony about Employer's Safety Policies (Tr. 1 , p. 85, LL 5-10).
The unrefuted sworn testimony from the Claimant, Mr. McGuire and Mr. Wilkinson
provides overwhelming evidence that Claimant was performing an act required by his job and
was not engaged in some abnormal, unforeseeable act that was foreign to his employment when
he bent down to tie the laces on his work boots on his Employer's premises on 12.18.09. Based
on this unrefuted evidence, no reasonable mind could reach the conclusion that Employer came
forward with sufficient evidence to rebut the premises presumption.
The Court should give Claimant the benefit of the premises presumption and rule as a
matter of law that Claimant's accident and injury arose out of his employment.
Where there is no dispute in the evidence and it is not reasonably susceptible of more
than one inference, the question of whether an accident to a workman arose out of
and in the course of employment is a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact
and may be reviewed by this court. Colson v. Steele, 73 Idaho 348, 351, 252 P.2d
1049, 1050 (1953). Gage v. Express Personnel, 135 Idaho 250, 253, 16 P.3d 926,
929 (2000) (emphasis supplied).
Commission explained the legal
came
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If the opposing party does come forward with such evidence, then
Commission
must ascertain whether the facts are sufficient to demonstrate that the accident is one
arising out of and
the course
employment without the benefit of the
presumption (R., Vol. I, p. 37, Ll. 20-22).

The converse must likewise be true. In cases like this where the Employer has failed to
come forward with sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, then by its own logic the
Commission is not required to go any further to ascertain whether the facts are sufficient to
demonstrate that the accident is one arising out of and in the course of employment because the
"arise out of' question has already been decided as a matter of law by proper application of the
presumption. To hold otherwise and still require the Claimant to adduce evidence on the "arise
out of' question after he has already received the benefit of the presumption, would nullify the
effect of the presumption and make it absolutely meaningless.
The Commission's description of the legal effect of failing to rebut the presumption is
consistent with this Court's holding in Kessler and I.R.E. 301 which explains the effect of failure
to rebut the presumption as follows:
If the party against whom a presumption operates fails to meet the burden of going
forward, the presumed fact shall be deemed proved. (I.R.E. 30l(a)).

The fact which shall be deemed proved by Employer's failure to rebut the premises
presumption in this case is that the Claimant's injury "arose out of' his employment. Since
Claimant is entitled to a
ruling that his injury "arose out of his
this case,

+
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case
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the great
of authority, injuries sustained by an employee upon premises
owned or controlled by his employer are generally deemed to have arisen out of and
the course of the employment. Annotation, 49
426-436(6) ....
In Burchett v. Anaconda Copper Min. Co., supra, this court affirmed a determination
that an employee who sustained an injury on the employer's premises as a result of a
fall on a slippery walkway was entitled to compensation. Therein =-:.:..=:::___:::="--="'-=
the accident was one that arose out of and in the course of
employment. Nichols v. Godfrey, 90 Idaho 345, 350-351, 411 P.2d 763, 765-766
(1966) (emphasis supplied).
The Commission not only committed plain legal error by refusing to apply the Foust
standard to determine whether Employer had rebutted the premises presumption, the
Commission compounded that error by formulating legal conclusions that were not supported by
any substantial and competent evidence in the record:
Regardless, we think the question of the current status of the Foust presumption is
mooted in this case in view of our conclusion that Defendant's have come forward
with evidence sufficient to permit reasonable minds to conclude that the subject
accident is not one arising out of and in the course of Claimant's employment. (R.,
Vol. I, p. 38, LL 20-23) (emphasis supplied).
Without citing any facts in the record to support its legal conclusion that Employer had
come forward with sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, the Commission just formulated
another legal conclusion and then looped the first conclusion with the second conclusion:
Employer has a reasonable expectation that Claimant will prepare himself such that
when he arrives at the work site, he is ready to go to work. Such pre-work
preparations such as eating and dressing are not ordinarily part of the work that a
worker is paid to perform, and therefore, such activities are not in the "course" of
employment. That
chooses, for reasons of personal convenience, to
perfom1 one
activities at the
place, as opposed to his home,
arguably
this activity into the "course"
Claimant's
on the course question
3).
1,
T
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Commission did not cite any legal authority to support its conclusion that an
Employer's "reasonable expectations" can

the premises presumption. Furthermore,

Commission's finding Employer had a "reasonable expectation" that Claimant would tie his
work boot laces before he entered upon his Employer's premises is directly contradicted by
Employer's testimony.
Mike McGuire gave unrefuted testimony in his pre-hearing deposition that Employer
never communicated its expectations that its employee were required to tie their boot laces
before entering upon the Employer's premises in a written policy, procedure, standard, rule or
guideline (McGuire Dep., p. 49, LI. 8-11; p. 50, LL 11-15; p. 55, L. 16

p. 56, L. 1).

To be objectively reasonable, "[t]he employer's expectations must be communicated
to the employee unless they flow naturally from the employment relationship."
Pimley v. Best Values, Inc., 132 Idaho 432, 436, 974 P.2d 78, 82 (1999). Sadid v.
Idaho State University, _Idaho_, 294 P.3d 1100, 1107 (2013).
The Commission also based its conclusion that Employer had met its Foust burden of
rebutting the "premises presumption" by stating another erroneous legal conclusion that was
directly contradicted by the Commission's own subsequent findings:
Similarly, the risk of injury to which Claimant was evidently exposed is
arguably a common risk, with no particular association to Claimant's
employment. We therefore conclude that Defendants have overcome
presumption, leaving the Commission to consider whether the evidence
supports a finding that Claimant has met his burden of
occurrence of an accident arising out of and in
course of
(R., Vol. I, p. 39, LL 3-7) (emphasis supplied).
Commission did not

any

to support its

can

overcome
to a

Claimant I Respondent's Brief

was

to

21

presumption,

Commission found that Claimant's job exposed

to an

or

associated

when he bent over to tie his work boot laces on 12.18.09 (R., Vol. I, p. 45, LI. 20-23; p. 46, LL 612 and LL 16-20;

47, LL 10-12 and p. 49, LL 24-26).

The Court should reverse the Commission's erroneous conclusion of law that Employer
successfully rebutted the premises presumption because that conclusion was based on the wrong
legal standard in direct violation of this Court's holding in Foust 3 and based on erroneous legal
conclusions and factual findings that were directly contradicted by the Commission's own
findings. Even if this Court determines that proper application of the premises presumption does
not entitle the Claimant to a ruling that his accident and injury "arose out of' his employment as
a matter of law, the Court should still affirm the Industrial Commission's 5.17.11 decision
because Employer has failed to satisfy the appellate standards set forth in Idaho Code §72-732.
2.

THE COURT SHOULD. AFFIRM THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 5.17.11
AROSE OUT OF EMPLOYMENT RULING BECAUSE EMPLOYER FAILED TO
PROVE THAT THE COMiy1ISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT WERE . NOT
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE AS REQUIRED BY
IDAHO CODE 72-73lQ}
Idaho code §72-732(1) requires Employer to prove that the Commission's findings of fact

were not supported by substantial competent evidence in order to set aside the Commission's
5.17.11 decision.

Employer has only challenged 1 finding of fact; i.e., that "the Industrial

Commission

by asserting UPS
occurred"

opposite
3

17,

13

8-9).

Idaho
exactly

to meet

The Commission adopted the Foust rule in

Claimant I

not dispute an accident or injury as defined
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6 months later.
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732(1).
Employer

s

12.18.09 "injury" did not "arise out of' his employment with UPS (CL. 9.28.l 0

8, 008001,

EX. 9, 009006). Employer did not dispute that the Claimant suffered an accident and injury that
occurred during the course of his employment. Based on the express language of Employer's
original 1.8.10 denial and its 2.26.10 secondary denial, the Industrial Commission had
substantial and competent evidence to conclude that Employer did not dispute that Claimant
suffered an accident and injury in the course of his employment. The Court should not disturb
those findings on appeal.
The Industrial Commission described the term "accident" as "a term of art" in its 5 .1 7.11
decision:
The term "accident" is a term of art under the Idaho Workers' Compensation law,
and is defined at I.C. § 72-102(18)(b) as follows: "Accident" means an unexpected,
undesigned, and unlooked for mishap, or untoward event, connected with the
industry in which it occurs, and which can be reasonably located as to time when and
place where it occurred, causing an injury. Here, it is clear that the mishap
described by Claimant is one that would qualify as an "accident" under the
statutory scheme. See Wynn v. JR. Simplot Company, 105 Idaho 102, 666 P.2d 629
(1983); Spivey v. Novartis Seed Inc., 137 Idaho 29, 43 P.3d 788 (2002); Page v.
1\1cCain Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 342, 109 P.3d 1084 (2005). Moreover, there is no
dispute that Claimant's injuries are causally related to
accident. (R., Vol. I,
p. 39, LL 9-18) (emphasis supplied).
"accident" and "injury" in the heading of argument 2 on page 12
was as

as

terms

art went.

the Claimant was
over to
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a "pop"
connected

his
industry

did

back.

argue that Claimant's accident was

which it occurred.

did

argue that Claimant failed to

reasonably locate the time and place where his "accident" occurred. Employer did got argue that
the Claimant's 12.18.09 accident did not "cause" his low back "injury. Employer conceded the
"in the course of employment" issue.
Based on the express language of its 2 written denials and Employer's failure to dispute
that Claimant suffered an "accident" and "injury" in its 12.17.10 Brief, the Commission clearly
had substantial and competent evidence to support its finding that Employer has never
disputed that Claimant suffered an accident and injury in the course of his employment. Even if
Employer had disputed that Claimant suffered an accident and injury in the course of his
employment, the Industrial Commission had substantial and competent evidence to support its
conclusion that Claimant suffered an accident and injury in the course of his employment on
12.18.09 when he bent over to tie the laces on his work boots and felt a "pop" in his low back 4•
Since Employer failed to prove that the Commission's findings of fact were not supported
by substantial and competent evidence, there is no basis for this Court to set aside the
Commission's findings pursuant to Idaho Code §72-732(1).

3.

that
not as a matter

4

See background facts set forth at pp. 3-7 of CL.
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from page 16 to page 33 of its 4.24.13 appellate
which did not as a matter of

Employer

to

a

support the Commission's 5.17. 1 "arose out of'

ruling.
The Industrial Commission's use of the positional risk doctrine given
findings
was in error, and its 2011 Decision warrants reversal. (ER. 4.24.13 App. Br., p. 33,

LL 7-8).
What findings? Employer did not identify a single finding of fact which did not as a matter
of law support the Commission's 5.17.11 ruling on the "arose out of' employment question.
Therefore, this Court cannot conduct effective appellate review. Even if Employer had identified
specific findings of fact which did not support the Commission's ruling, Employer's argument
would still fail to meet the standards of Idaho Code §72-732(4) because it is very clear that all of
the Commission's findings supported its ruling that Claimant's injury arose out of his
employment:
Here, the risk of injury in question ~ connected to the employment because it was
encountered by Claimant as result of the Claimant's performance of a task that was
either part of his work, or reasonably incidental thereto. To conclude, as we do, that
the risk of bending over to tie one's shoe preparatory to beginning the workday is a
work-connected risk, is entirely consistent with the proposition that an accident does
not arise out of employment unless there is proof of a causal connection between the
conditions under which the work must be performed and the resulting injury.
Claimant had demonstrated, and no rational person would disagree, that anyone
whose job includes the requirement of carrying boxes all day, frequently in a way
that obscures his view of the ground immediately in front of him, would do well to
keep his shoes tied. It strains credulity to suggest that the action Claimant took
preparatory to the start of his shift did not confer a benefit upon Employer by
reducing the chances
Claimant would suffer a trip and fall. It strains credulity to
suggest that
risk
injury associated with the tying
the shoelaces was not
therefore one
as a natural incident
Claimant
to
his

Claimant/
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evidence is such
it cannot be asce1iained whether Claimant's injury was
occasioned as a result of a risk personal to him versus an employment connected
20- p. 45, L. 12).
(R.,
I, p. 45,
However, true this may be, the fact of the matter is that Claimant suffered this
particular injury as the result of his attempts to accommodate the requirements of his
job. Because the Claimant was necessarily required to tie his shoelaces before
starting work, his job clearly created an actual risk which ultimately resulted in
Claimant's injury. (R., Vol. I, p. 46, LL 16-20).
Even though we have found that Claimant's employment did, indeed, subject him to
an actual risk of injury due to workplace demands which required of him that his
shoelaces be tied, the "arising" test explained in Eriksen v. Nez Perce County, supra,
may still present an obstacle to the claim. (R., Vol. I, p. 47, LL 10-13).
Therefore, after Spivey, it seems clear that where the risk of injury is one to which
claimant is equally exposed both in, and without, his employment, the resulting
injury is one which will be deemed to arise out of employment. This rule embraces
coverage for both neutral and equal risks. However, it is clear that before benefits are
payable, it must be demonstrated that claimant actually was exposed to the risk in
question in the course of his employment, and that exposure to that risk led to the
lllJUry.
In summary, we find that the risk of injury at issue in the instant matter is likely not a
neutral risk, but, instead, a risk of injury that bears a causal connection to the work
that Claimant was hired to perform. However, like a true "neutral" risk, it is a risk of
injury to which Claimant was equally exposed apart from his employment. Spivey v.
Novartis Seed, Inc., supra, makes it clear that injuries resulting from both types of
risks so characterized should be deemed to arise out of employment. To the extent
that the longstanding rule explained in Eriksen v. Nez Perce County, supra, is to the
contrary, we perceive that rule is overruled by Spivey. Quite apart from the question
of whether or not Claimant is entitled to a presumption favoring the compensability
of this claim, the evidence establishes that Claimant has satisfied his burden of
proving the occurrence of an accident both arising out and in the course of
employment (R., Vol. I, 49,
18 - p. 50, L. 7 ).
findings fact supported its ruling on

as a matter
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§72-732(4) and there is no basis for this

to set aside

Commission's 5.17.11

WHEN THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE PROPERLY APPLIED TO
THIS COURT'S MODERN HOLDINGS WHICH REQUIRE A LIBERAL
INTERPRETATION OF THE TERMS "ACCIDENT" AND "INJURY", THERE IS NO
DOUBT THAT THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF_ FACT SUPPORT THE
COMMISSION'S RULING ON THE "AROSE OUT OF" EMPLOYMENT QUESTION
AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Employer has accused this Court of misreading the plain language of Idaho Code §72102(18) and legislating from the bench in Spivey in order to expand the scope of the terms
"accident" and "injury" beyond what the legislature intended (ER 4.24.13 App. Br., p. 19, LL 1921; p. 26, LL 15-18; p. 28, L. 20

p. 29, L. 17). The irony of Employer's argument must be

pointed out. Although Employer uses euphemistic language to conceal its true objective in this
case, what the Employer is really asking this Court to do is judicially re-write the plain definition
of the terms accident and injury set forth in Idaho Code §72-102(18) to include a new element
in the PLi!!l_a facie case of the accident I injury theory which would require the Claimant to
prove that he was exposed to a "greater risk" while performing an actual job duty that was
peculiar to and characteristic of the job duty itself and _not a common risk that he would be
equally exposed to outside of work in order to have a compensable accident I injury claim that
"arose out of' his employment
The Court should decline
Professor Larson's treatise

12.17.10 post-hearing brief,

13,

13-15; p. 20,

invitation to survey 39 cases dating back 82 years
can reject

"greater risk" argument by

s
to
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This Court began its

trend of rejecting Employer's attempts to give an

narrow

terms accident and injury in

v.

Simplot Co., 105 Idaho 102, 666 P.2d 629 (1983).

~~~,~~~~~"-"-"-'~

Commission or Simplot's ~'.:'.:_"~"~'".L-'."=:_:_o~~::.:-:::_~~:.i
in view of the circumstances presented in the instant case ...

It is enough to note that claimant here, as indicated by the medical evidence, suffered
his injury at a particular time, at a particular place, while engaged in his normal and
ordinary work for his employer. The fact that Wynn's spine may have been weak
and predisposed him to a ruptured disc does not prevent an award since our
compensation law does not limit awards to workmen who, prior to injury, were
in sound condition and perfect health. Rather, an employer takes an employee
as he finds him ....

As this Court has repeatedly stated, "If the claimant be engaged in his ordinary usual
work and the strain of such labor becomes sufficient to overcome the resistance of
the claimant's body and causes an injury, the injury is compensable." Whipple v.
Brundage, 80 Idaho 193, 327 P.2d 383 (1958); Lewis v. Dept. of Law Enforcement,
79 Idaho 40, 311 P.2d 976 (1957) ....
We reverse the decision of the Industrial Commission and remand the cause to the
Commission for the entry of an appropriate award to claimant. Costs to appellant.
Wynn, supra, 105 Idaho l 04 -105, 666 P. 2d 631-632 (emphasis supplied).
In Gage v. Express Personnel, 135 Idaho 250, 16 P.3d 926 (2000), this Court clearly

rejected Employer's argument that the Claimant must prove that he was exposed to a "greater

error when it concluded
<>hudu not
furtherance of

which the
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decided upon its own attendant facts and circumstances under a liberal
construction of the Worker's Compensation Act. Beebe v. Horton, 77
Idaho 388, 390, 293 P.2d 661, 662 (1956).
hold that the Commission
erred in concluding that Gage's injury did not arise out of and in the course
of her employment. Accordingly, we reverse the Commission's decision
denying worker's compensation benefits. id. 135 Idaho 254, 16 P.3d 930
(emphasis supplied).
In Page v. 1\fcCain Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 342, 109 P.3d 1084 (2005), the Court affirmed
its holding in Gage that the Claimant does noj: need to be exposed to a "greater risk" of injury
while performing an actual job duty to prove a compensable accident I injury claim:
The Commission's reliance on Perez is misplaced and Spivey provides a more
analogous analysis. The Commission erred in concluding that Page did not
experience an "accident" when she rose from the chair.
Because this case will be remanded to the Commission, we note two additional
concerns regarding the injury at issue here. The testimony of two physicians
establishes that while the meniscus tear could have happened at any time, based
on the "grabbing," pain and locking of the knee, the probability is that it
happened at the time Page rose from the chair. Case law holds that doubts about
an injury arising out of and in the course of employment are resolved in favor of
the claimant. Dinius, 133 Idaho at 574, 990 P.2d at 740. Id. 141 Idaho 347-348,
109 P.3d 1089-1090.
The Page Court found that that the facts presented were closely analogous to Spivey even
though the Claimant in Page was clearly not performing an actual job duty when she suffered
her accident and injury while rising from a chair in the break-room. The Court made it very
over whether an accident I injury arose out

clear that

Just like the Claimants in
this case can point to the specific act
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Gage, Spivey and Page I,

bending over to
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on

Employer's premises at 6:30 AM on 12.18.09
by severe pain as

source of his "accident"

he felt a "pop" in his low back
back "injury"

5

.

Employer argued to the Commission that this Court's analysis in Page was flawed and
had no precedential value because the Court failed to discuss whether the Claimant's injury was
connected with her employment or arose out of her employment (ER. 12.17.10 Br., p. 15, LL 1815). Employer is really arguing that this Court should narrow the definitions of "accident" and
"injury" to require the Claimant to prove that he was exposed to a greater risk while performing
an actual job duty in order for his injury to be connected with his employment and arise out of
his employment. A plain reading of the clear language of the statute refutes Employer's
argument:
An analysis of whether the accident requirement has been met must begin with a
review of the relevant statutory language. Idaho Code section 72-102( 17)(b)
defines accident as "an unexpected, undesigned, and unlooked for mishap, or
untoward event, connected with the industry in which it occurs, and which can
be reasonably located as to time when and place where it occurred, causing an
injury." An injury is defined as "a personal injury caused by an accident arising
out of and in the course of any employment covered by the worker's
compensation law." I.C. § 72-102(17)(a). Whether an employee is entitled to
compensation under the Worker's Compensation Act requires that the injury
must have been caused by an accident "arising out of and in the course of any
employment." Dinius v. Loving Care and More, Inc., 133 Idaho 572, 574, 990
P.2d 738, 740 (1999) (citations omitted); Seamans v. Maaco Auto Painting, 128
Idaho 747, 918 P.2d 1192 (1996). "The words 'out of have been held to refer to
the origin and cause of the accident and the words
the course of refer to the
time, place, and the circumstances under
the
occurred." Dinius,
133 Idaho at 574, 990 P.2d at 740
omitted). If there is doubt
surrounding
accident
arose out
and
course
employment, the matter
be
employee. Id. (citations

See background facts set forth at pp. 3-7 of Claimant's 1l.19.i0

Claimant I Respondent's Brief

Brief.

Page 30

employer
an employee as it
him or her; a preexisting infirmity
does not eliminate the opportunity for a worker's compensation claim provided
the employment aggravated or accelerated the injury for which compensation is
sought. Wynn v. JR. Simplot Co., 105 Idaho 102, 104, 666 P.2d 629, 631
(1983). Spivey v. Novartis Seed, Inc., 137 Idaho 29, 33, 43 P.3d 788, 792
(2002). Ibid. 141 Idaho 347, 109 P.3d 1089.
The Page Court did not require the Claimant to prove that she was performing an actual

job duty that exposed her to a "greater risk" when she suffered her accident and injury. This
has never been the law in Idaho:
Plaintiff did not have to be actually engaged in the performance of the particular
tasks of her employment at the time of the accident to have it arise out of and in
the course of her employment. Nichols v. Godfrey, 90 Idaho 345, 349, 411 P.2d
763, 765 (1966).
The Page I Court relied heavily on the closely analogous facts of Spivey v. Novartis Seed,
13 7 Idaho 29, 43 P.3d 788 (2002) when it reversed the Commission's denial of benefits. The

Spivey Court's rejection of the "greater risk" doctrine is the reason why Employer brought this
test case before the Court on appeal (ER. 4.24.13 Br., p. 21, LL 7-8; p. 33, Ll. 7-8).
The Commission determined that the record supported the decision and declined
defendants' 'invitation to introduce risk analysis from the occupational disease
legal theory into the accident and injury legal theory.' Id. 137 Idaho 32, 43 P.3d 791
(emphasis supplied) ....
Appellants additionally urge that the Commission erred in its refusal to utilize a
greater risk analysis in this case when determining whether the respondent was
entitled to benefits .... Because her job did not place her at greater risk for injury
than her daily routine, appellants contend that there is not substantial and competent
L'"""''"'"' to
Commission's findings.
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In this case, the appellants suggest a return to the rationale of Wells
Spivey to
that her job duties
at a
for
that encountered by the general public performing the same physical motions.
analysis is no
of a claimant in light of
However, a greater
A1ayo and Kessler. ...
The respondent, Spivey, met her burden by establishing that she sustained an
injury that resulted
an accident that arose out of and in the course of her
employment. A greater risk analysis is not required within the context
accident/injury cases to determine a compensable injury. Ibid, 137 Idaho 35, 43
P.3d 794 (emphasis supplied).
This Court clearly held in Spivey that the "greater risk" doctrine cannot be applied to
accident I injury claims and that holding is not the subject of legitimate debate by reasonable
minds. Idaho Employers have had 11 years to come to the realization that this Court has no
intention of overruling Spivey.
Since Spivey was decided in 2002, this Court has cited its holding in Spivey with
approval in at least 8 different cases including, Konvalinka v. Bonneville County, 140 Idaho 477,
95 P.3d 628 (2004); Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 141Idaho342, 109 P.3d 1084 (2005); Clarkv.

Truss, 142 Idaho 404, 128 P. 3d 941 (2006); Hutton v. Manpower, Inc., 143 Idaho 573, 149 P.3d
848 (2006); Stevens-McAtee v. Potlatch Corp., 145 Idaho 325, 179 P.3d 288 (2008); Fife v.

Home Depot, Inc., 151 Idaho 509, 260 P.3d 1180 (2011); Henry v. Department of Correction,
Docket No. 39039 (Filed: 1.23.13) and Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., Docket No. 39337
(Filed: 4.26.13).
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language of

element into the

an

inject a

Code §72-102(18)

case

proving a compensable accident I injury claim.

Employer has failed to meet its burden of proving under Idaho Code §72-732(4) that the
Commission's findings of fact do not as a matter of law support its ruling that the Claimant's
injury "arose out of his employment". The Court does not even need to perform a "greater risk"
analysis in order to affirm the Commission's ruling.
5.

EMPLOYER HAD--- AN OBLIGATION
PROMPTLY COMPLY WITH THE
- TO
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S
5.17.11
ORDER
AND 12.8.11 ORDER AND PAY ALL
___
BENEFITS ORDERED
""

When the legislature adopted the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act, it granted exclusive
jurisdiction to the Industrial Commission to resolve all disputes arising under the Act. (See

Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Van Tine, 132 Idaho 902, 906, 980 P.2d 566, 570 (1999) (Van Tine II)).

The legislature has protected the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction by instructing the Courts
that they do not have the jurisdiction to interfere with the Commission in the performance of its
duties:
72-733. Limited jurisdiction of courts. Except as herein provided, no court of this
state shall have jurisdiction to review, vacate, set aside, reverse, revise, correct,
amend or annul any order or award of the commission, or to suspend or delay the
execution or operation thereof, or to enjoin, restrain or interfere with the commission
in the performance of its duties.
If the Courts of this state cannot

duties,

the

Commission in the performance it its

cannot

to act

Commission's

a

5. 7.11
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Commission's exclusive jurisdiction by pointing out
to

own

the Commission had

Vol. I, p.

12-1

(emphasis

supplied).
Employer's refusal to comply with the Commission's Orders left the Claimant without an
effective legal remedy since this Court had already determined in its 7.27.11 Order Dismissing
Appeal (R., Vol. I, p. 74-75) and 8.15.11 Order Denying Motion For Clarification (R., Vol. I, p.
76) that the Commission's 5.17.11 Order was not a final and appealable Order. The Claimant
could not file the 5 .17 .11 Order with the District Court and seek enforcement against Employer's
assets pursuant to Idaho Code §72-735. The Claimant asks this Court for an Order which
requires Employer to comply with all of the Industrial Commission's Orders and describes the
consequences of non-compliance.
6.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 12.5.12
ORDER APPORTIONING 7% OF THE CLAIMANT'S 19% PPI RATING BACK TO
THE CLAIMANT'S 10.22.90 LOW BACK INJURY BECAUSE THAT RATING WAS
BASED ON DR. FRIZZELL'S 3.10.11 PPI I APPORTIONMENT OPINION WHICH
LACKED A PROPER FOUNDATION
OF SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT
--------EVIDENCE?
-·-~-·---·-

·----·~

The Industrial Commission concluded that the Claimant should receive a 7% whole
person PPI rating for his 10.22.90 low back injury based on Dr. Frizzell's 3.10.11 apportionment
medical opinion (R., Vol. III, p. 421, LL 15-18). This Court should reverse the

of

Commission's decision to assign
to

10.22.90

of the Claimant's 19% whole person

rating 2

back injury because Dr. Frizzell's 7%

as
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a.

Dr. Frizzell originally opined in his 12.6.10 PPI report that 0% of the Claimant's 20%
PPI rating should be apportioned to the Claimant's 10.22.90 injury because "he was
released to full duty without
permanent physical impairment or restrictions" (CL.
5.17.12 EX. 1, 001089);

b.

Dr. Frizzell based 100% of his 12.6.10 20% PPI rating and 100% of his 3.10.11 19%
111
whole person PPI rating on 5 PPI rating factors from the 5 Edition of the AMA
GUIDES which were all due exclusively to the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial injury
(CL. 5.17.12 EX. 1, 001089). The first 2 PPI rating factors were based exclusively on
the 2 back surgeries that the Claimant had to undergo as the direct result of his
12.18.09 industrial accident and totaled 14%. The final 3 PPI factors were all based
on Claimant's Range of Motion (ROM) deficits which were not due to Claimant's
10.22.90 low back injury but due to his 12.18.09 injury (CL. 5.17.12. EX. 1, 001109)
(Frizzell Dep. p. 24, LL 2-8).

c.

Dr. Frizzell did not properly follow the apportionment methodology of the AMA
GUIDES. Even though Dr. Frizzell stated in his 6.27.11 letter that all 3-steps in the
apportionment methodology had been met (Cl. 5.17.12 EX 1, 001109), when he was
asked to explain that bald conclusion during his 6.4.12 post-hearing deposition, Dr.
Frizzell responded with "No, I can't confirm that" (Frizzell Depo. p. 22, L. 7 - p. 23,
L4). The Industrial Commission has historically rejected apportionment of PPI
opinions based on the 5th Edition of the AMA GUIDES in cases where the rating
physician failed to specifically follow the 3-step apportionment protocol set forth on
page 11 of the 5th Edition (As Claimant points out, the AMA Guides are instructive
regarding apportionment .... Dr. Phillips failed to address the "protocol" established by
the Guides and, hence, his apportionment analysis lacks credence. (See Moncada v.
Gonzalez, 2007 WL 1904252, LC. No. 2004-010943, ~ 2-13 on pp. 7-8, (Filed:
4.24.07).

d.

Dr. Frizzell admitted during his 6.4.12 post-hearing deposition that the 7% PPI rating
that he assigned to the Claimant's 10.22.90 low back injury did not meet the PPI
criteria of Idaho Code §72-424 because there was no proof in this case that the
Claimant's 10.22.90 low back injury had an adverse impact on the Claimant's
personal efficiency in the activities of daily living, such as self-care, communication,
normal living postures, ambulation, elevation,
nonspecialized activities
of bodily members
Depo. p. 28,
17

e.
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be made prior to
determination of permanent impairment, which cannot be
evaluated until maximum medical improvement has been reached. See I.C. §§ 72422, 424.
v.
Depot, 152 Idaho 605, 609, 272 P.3d 577, 581
12).

f.

Dr. Frizzell admitted during his 6.4.10 post-hearing deposition that the 5th Edition of
the AMA GUIDES was not in effect when the Claimant achieved MMI from his
10.22.90 low back injury and admitted that he did not know if the Claimant would
have qualified for a PPI rating based on the edition of the AMA GUIDES that was in
effect when the Claimant achieved MMI from his 10.22.90 injury (Frizzell Depo., p.
21, Ll. 5 - p. 22, L. 6).

g.

Since UPS's own Independent Medical Evaluator (IME) physician, Richard Knoebel,
M.D., evaluated the Claimant when he achieved MMI from his 10.22.90 injury on
4.2.91, Dr. Knoebel's 0% PPI rating was more reliable than the 7% PPI rating that Dr.
Frizzell issued 21 years later on 3 .10 .11. (CL. 5 .1 7.12 EX. 1, 00I019 and 001024).

Since the Commission based its 7% PPI rating on Dr. Frizzell's 3.10.11 opinion which
was not based on a proper foundation of substantial and competent evidence, the Court should

reverse the Commission's finding that a 7% PPI rating should have been assigned to the
Claimant's 10.22.90 low back injury.
7.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 12.5.10
FINDING THAT THE 7% PPI RATING THAT DR. FRIZZELL ISSUED WAS A
"SUBJECTIVE HINDRANCE" TO EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO THE CLAIMANT'S
12.18.09 ACCIDENT I INJ!JRY
The Commission based its finding that the Claimant's other preexisting impairments

were not subjective hindrances to employment on the significant factor that no physician had
issued the Claimant any permanent physical restrictions for those impairments prior to the
Claimant's 12.18.09

p.

same logic applies to Claimant's

7-13).

10.22.90

0.22.00
10
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evaluator, Dr. Knoebel, concluded

the Claimant reached

injury on 4.2.91 that
.~ . . v

. . .,

10.22.90 low

or

not have

from his 10.22.90 low back injury and released the Claimant to return to full duty

unrestricted work (003019-003020 and 003024).
The Industrial Commission has held that a Claimant cannot prove disability above
impairment if the Claimant does not have any permanent physical restrictions that adversely
impact his functional capacity:
Absent some functional loss, it is hard to conceive of a factual scenario that would
support an award of disability over and above impairment; if the injured worker is
physically capable of performing the same types of physical activities as he
performed prior to the industrial accident, then neither wage loss nor loss of access to
the labor market is implicated. Wright v. Hagadone Photography, 2019 WL
3011038, LC. No. 2004-507331, ~ 51(Filed:7.16.10).
Since the Claimant was released to perform full duty work without any restrictions after
his 10.22.90 low back injury and succeeded in the performance of very heavy work for UPS for
approximately 19 years until his 12.18.09 injury, the Commission did not have any substantial
and competent evidence in the record to support its conclusion the Claimant's 10.22.90 low back
injury was a subjective hindrance.
Although the absence of restrictions was a significant

which supported the

Commission's finding that the Claimant's other pre-existing impairments were not subjective
Commission ignored this
restrictions
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With respect to the 1990 low back injury, addition to determining
entitled to a 7%
rating for
1nJury,
Frizzell felt it appropriate
following that injury Claimant should have observed certain limitations/restrictions
in order to protect his back from further injury. He proposed that Claimant should
avoid maximum lifting of over 75 pounds. The sensibility of this recommendation is
well borne out by Claimant's subsequent history. Although Claimant returned to
unrestricted work following the 1990 low back injury, he did not stay symptom free
(R., Vol. III, p. 423, LL 14-20).
This Court should reverse the Commission's reliance on Dr. Frizzell's restrictions because
those restrictions were not based on a proper foundation of substantial and competent evidence
as demonstrated by the following summary:
a.

Prior to issuing his hypothetical 9 .19 .11 restrictions, Dr. Frizzell had already issued 3
prior opinions stating unequivocally that 100% of the Claimant's restrictions were due
exclusively to his 12.18.09 industrial accident and Claimant did not have any restrictions
related to his 10.22.90 low back injury (CL. 5.17.12 EX. 1, 001090; 001102 and 001108001109);

b.

Dr. Frizzell could not explain during his post-hearing deposition what facts, legal analysis
or methodology in the 36-page legal decision that he received from Employer's counsel
caused him to change his 3 prior opinions and issue hypothetical restrictions for the
Claimant's 10.22.90 injury (CL. 5.17.12 EX. 1, 001114-001116). Dr. Frizzell could not
even confirm that he read the decision (Frizzell 6.4.12 Depo., p. 31, L. 4 - p. 32, L. 11 ).

c.

Dr. Frizzell' s 9 .19 .11 hypothetical restrictions were directly contradicted by the
Claimant's unrefuted hearing testimony which established that his 10.22.90 low back
injury did not interfere with his ability to perform the essential functions of job for UPS;
that all of his attending physicians who treated him for his preexisting injuries had
released him to return to full duty unrestricted work; that he never asked UPS to make
any job modifications based on his preexisting impairments and UPS never imposed any
14 - p. 52, L.
job modifications because of his preexisting impairments (Tr. 2, p. 35,
lO)(Tr. 2, p. 157,
14- 160, L 13).
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modify the essential functions of a job to accommodate any injured employee's physical
disability (ISIF
K, p. 37, L. 23- p. 38, L. 5).
Wilkinson confirmed that none
Claimant's prior physical injuries I impairments adversely impacted his ability to
perform the essential duties of his Package Driver job (ISIF EX. K, p. 38, L.25 -p. 39,
14).
e.

The Commission has expressed concern in other cases about hypothetical restrictions
are applied retroactively as if they had always been in place (The Referee finds the
panel's approach, and Mr. Jordan's reliance upon it, flawed in that it formulates work
restrictions that did not previously exist, applies them retroactively, then analyzes
Claimant's condition as though the restrictions had always been in place). Sommer v.
ISJF, 2008 WL 3090703, I.C. No. 2001-012652 (Filed 7.7.08).
The Court should reverse the Industrial Commission's conclusion that the Claimant's

10.22.90 low back impairment was a subjective hindrance to employment because that
conclusion was based on Dr. Frizzell's opinion that was not supported by a proper foundation
and directly contradicted by the reality of Claimant's ability to perform heavy physical labor for
19 years prior to his 12.18.09 injury.

8.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FINDING
THAT THE
CLAIMANT'S 3.10.11
7% IMPAIRMENT
"COMBINED WITH" THE
·--.
-·-··--·
CLAIMANT'S 12.18.09 ACCIDENT I INJURY TO CAUSE THE CLAIMANT TO
BECOME TOTALLY AND PERMANENTLY DISABLED
"

'

·-~~-~·-·---~-~----

The Commission relied on the following factors to support its erroneous conclusion that
the Claimant's 10.22.90 low back injury "combined with" his 12.18.09 industrial injury to cause
total and permanent disability:
a.

The 7°!o PPI Rating anci;Restrictions That Dr. f'tlzzell issued in 2011
(R., Vol.
425, LL 8-11).
The 7%

the

issued

2011 were not

on a

were
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the reality of

Claimant's ability to perform unrestricted physical labor for 19 years until

his 12.18.09 injury.
b.

Claimant was not symptom free in the years imme<:liately preceding the 12.18.09 accident
(R., Vol. III, p. 425, L. 14-15).
The record in this case does not contain any medical causation opinion from any

doctor which established that Claimant's episodic "sore back" over a 26-year career with UPS
was due specifically to his 10.22.90 L4-5 disc injury. The Commission formulated its own
medical causation opinion when it concluded that Claimant's episodic low back pain over the
years was caused specifically by his 10.22.90 L4-5 low back injury. This Court held in 1\1azzone

v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., Docket No. 39337 (Filed: 4.26.13) that it is improper for the
Commission to formulate its own medical opinions where medical evidence is lacking in the
record.
c.

Claimant attempted to find ways to do his job wl}ic,:heased th~<i~mands onfil~_Qack
(R., Vol. III, p. 425, L. 15-16).
The Commission based its finding that Claimant self-modified his job to accommodate

his "sore back" on: (1) a box marked "no" in a 3.15.06 Supervisor's Ride Along Report
(Employer 5.17.12 EX. 15, p.120); (2) a box marked "no" in a 7.20.09 report (Employer's
5.17.12 EX. 15, p. 127); and (3) a hand written hearsay statement at the bottom of a 7.29.08
accusing

of "[ e ]excessive backing due to protectiveness of sore back"
124).
not accept 3 references to
career to
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because of his 10.22.90
Supervisor,

back injury - especially given the fact that

Wilkinson, admitted during

5.8.12 pre-hearing deposition

Claimant's
sees a

tendency in all UPS Package Car Drivers to back their vehicles as close to the delivery point as
possible so they don't have to carry the packages as far (Wilkinson, 5.8.12 Depo., p. 44, LL 1922).
Employer did not present any medical causation evidence to the Commission which
established that the "sore back" referred to in the 7.29.08 ride-along-report was caused by the

Claimant's 10.22.90 L4-5 back injury. The Claimant's "sore back" could have been caused by
any number of soft tissue problems ranging from the top of his thoracic spine at T-1 to the
bottom of his lumbar spine at L5-S 1. Since no doctor established a causal relationship between
the "sore back" hearsay statement in the 7.29.08 report and Claimant's 10.22.90 low back injury,

the Commission had to manufacture its own medical causation opinion in order to conclude
that residuals from the Claimant's 10.22.90 low back injury are what caused him to self-modify
his job through "excessive backing." The Court should reverse the Commission's "combined
with" finding because it was based on the Commission's own medical causation opinions in
direct violation of this Court's holding in Afazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., Docket No. 3933 7
(Filed: 4.26.13).
d.

The mechanics of the ClaimaI1t's 12.18.09 bending~9ver to tie the laces on his work boots
injury were such a "trivial exercise" that they could not have caused Claimant's 12.18.09
disc herniatio11 aQ.§_~111-"C:laimant' s signi:fiQ<!Ilt preexisting condition at IA-~
(R.,
425,
16-22).
case.

opinions

case came
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never

not cause the

could

disc herniation

12.18.09

preexisting condition at

exercise"

as found by the Commission (R., Vol. III, p. 425, LI. 16-22).

The Commission manufactured that medical causation opinion on its own without any

medical opinion from any medical expert in this case to support that conclusion.
Dr. Harris opined that the act of Claimant bending over to tie the laces on his work boots
caused the Claimant's 12.18.09 "acute injury" (CL. 9.28.10 EX. 2, 002003). Dr. Frizzell
confirmed that bending over at the waist can increase the intradiskal disc pressure and cause a
lumbar disk to rupture and that he has seen that happen many times throughout his career. Dr.
Frizzell stated unequivocally that it was the act of bending over to tie his work boot laces that
caused the Claimant's large L4-5 disk herniation on 12.18.09 (CL. 9.28.10. EX. 3, 003040003041; 003042; 003054; 003059; 003062).
The Court should reverse the Commission's medical causation opinion that the act of
bending over at the waist was a "trivial exercise" that could not cause the Claimant's L4-5 disc
herniation "absent Claimant's significant preexisting condition at L4-5" because the
Commission based that finding on its own medical causation opinion which was clearly
improper under Mazzone.
e.

Claimant's preexistigg condition_JitL1:-5 clearlv "set the stage" for C_laimant's 12J~~j)9
accident and
in that sense "combined with" Claimant's- 12.18.09 accident
to cause total
·--~~--·--

426, L. 2).
s
not
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Claimant's 10.22.90 injury. Dr. Frizzell admitted during his 6.4.12 deposition that Claimant's
prior to his 12.18.09 injury and that it

10.22.90 disc injury could have
would be

speculation to assume that his 10.22.90 L4-5 disc protrusion was present prior to

his 12.18.09 injury (Frizzell, 6.4.12 Dep., p. 34, L. 9 - p. 36, L. 13). Dr. Frizzell established a
clear causal relationship between the Claimant's 12.18.09 accident and his large L4-5 herniated
disc (CL. 9.28.10. EX. 3, 003040-003041; 003042; 003054; 003059; 003062).
The Commission based its entire "combined with" conclusion on medical causation

opinions that were improperly formulated by the Commission itself and directly contradicted
by the unrefuted medical causation opinions of the Claimant's attending physicians. Based on
this Court's holding in Mazzone, the Claimant respectfully requests that the Court reverse the
Commission's conclusion that the Claimant's 10.22.90 impairment "combined with" his
12.18.09 injury to cause total and permanent disability.
9.

THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE COMMISSION'S 12.5.12 RULING THAT
QUASI-ESTOPPEL PREVENTS EMPLOYER FROM SHIFTING LIABILITY TO
THE ISIF
Employer argues that it was error for the Commission to apply the doctrine of quasi-

estoppel because that legal doctrine is an affirmative defense that had to be affirmatively pled by
ISIF and listed in the Industrial Commission's 3.7.12 Notice of Hearing. The Commission
rejected Employer's lack of notice arguments because apportionment
§72-406 or Idaho

§72-332 was

notice
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point of synopsizing the positions of
parties is to illustrate that the fight over
whether the opinion of Dr. Frizzell should prevail over the opinion of Dr. Knoebel is
a
to
outcome
this matter. One need only
review the deposition of Dr. Frizzell, or the many letters between Dr. Frizzell and
counsel for Claimant and Employer to understand that the parties grasp the
importance of obtaining a favorable opinion on the issue of apportiomnent (R., Vol.
III, p. 446, L.18-23) (emphasis supplied).
One of the noticed issues is whether, and to what extent, Claimant is entitled to PPI
benefits, and it was in connection with his pursuit of PPI benefits that Claimant
articulated his position that Employer should not be allowed to have it both ways.
Viewed in the context of Claimant's burden of proof, his reliance on the
doctrine of quasi-estoppel seems to be less an affirmative defense, and more an
argument made in support of proving his prima facie case (R., Vol. III, p. 448,
LL 1-9) (emphasis supplied).
After being placed on notice of quasi-estoppel, Employer chose to completely ignore that
doctrine in its post-hearing brief:
"Moreover, although both Claimant and the ISIF argued in their post-hearing briefs
that Employer should not be allowed to take a different position in this action
concerning Claimant's preexisting impairment than it did in connection with the
1990 accident, Employer's post-hearing brief devotes not one sentence to
treatment of the doctrine of quasi-estoppel or to the ISIF's challenge to
Employer's inconsistent position. From the Employer's failure to protest, the
Commission concluded that Employer gave its implied consent to the Commission's
consideration of these arguments. To the extent necessary, the Commission will treat
these arguments as though they were raised in the issues noticed for hearing (See
IRCP l 5(b); 1Vfurphy v. Browning Freight, 1986 IIC 0664 (1986)) (R., Vol. III, p.
448, L. 10-18) (emphasis supplied).
The Commission cited all of the documents that Employer filed with the Industrial
Commission which supported
position on

PPI issue

Commission's

that Employer had taken a previous
8 - p. 451,
to

10)

rejected

s

a "position".

to
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7%

Claimant's 19%
findings

rating 21 years back to his 10.22.90 injury because the

fact were supported

substantial and competent evidence

the

unique facts of this case supported application of the quasi-estoppel doctrine as a matter of law.
10.
RECOVERING l 00% OF ALL PAST DENIED MEDICAL BENEFITS FROM
EMPLOYER
-----This Court's holding in Neel v. Western Construction, 147 Idaho 146, 149, 206 P.3d 852,
855 (2009) placed an obligation on Employer to pay I 00% of the invoiced amount of ALL past
denied medical benefits incurred by Claimant from date of injury on 12.18.09 to date when the
Industrial Commission deemed this claim compensable on 5 .17 .11. After the Supreme Court
dismissed Employer's 2nd interlocutory appeal on 1.30.12, Employer finally complied with Neel
and paid Claimant 100% of the invoiced amount of the medical benefit claims that had been
adjudicated at the 9.28.l 0 Hearing as Claimant's EX. 7 on or about 2.6.12.
After making that unconditional payment of Claimant's 9.28.10 EX. 7 medical benefit
claims, Employer disingenuously raised the doctrine of res judicata to justify its refusal pay
100% of all past denied medical benefit claims that were not adjudicated at the 9.28.10 Hearing
as part of CL.

7 (CL. 5.17.12 EX. 17). Employer barely devoted I-page to its resjudicata

argument in its 8 .15. 12 brief and

not even

collateral estoppel.

Commission followed this Court's holding in Wernecke v.

Dist.

147

277,

207

was
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represents a distinct claim for a benefit payable under the workers' compensation
laws. Every bill that was submitted could have been the subject
number of
defenses to payment raised by Employer/Surety. Employer/Surety could have argued
that one or more of the bills were incurred outside the chain of referral
Employer/Surety could have argued that the care was not required by Claimant's
physician. Employer/Surety could have argued to the Commission that it should have
found the care represented by a particular bill to be unreasonable. The point is that
every bill for medical services represents a discrete claim for workers' compensation
benefits. Accordingly, since it is clear that the bills totaling $24,627.80 are new bills,
Claimant's entitlement to that which was not adjudicated at the prior hearing, the
doctrine of res judicata does not bar Claimant's litigation of those bills at this time,
notwithstanding that most of those bills are for services rendered prior to the date of
the September 28, 2010 hearing. Aside from the res judicata defense, no other
defenses to these bills have been raised by Employer/Surety. Accordingly, and per
Neel v. Western Construction, Inc., 147 Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 852 (2009), Claimant is
entitled to 100% of the invoiced amount of the bills set forth at Claimant's
5.17.12Exhibit 14 (R., Vol. III, p. 431, Ll. 3-18).
Finally, Claimant has claimed entitlement to the sum of $1,684.71, representing
travel expenses incurred in connection with the medical care, $264.75 representing
per diem expenses associated with medical care, and $200.01 representing lodging
expenses incurred in connection with medical treatment. (See C. 5 .17.12 Ex. 16).
Some of these expenses were incurred prior to the September 28, 2010 hearing, and
some were incurred subsequent thereto. Claimant contends, and Employer/Surety
does not dispute, that these expenses are otherwise compensable as medical and
related expenses under Idaho Code § 72-432. However, Employer/Surety asserts that
those expenses incurred prior to the September 28, 2010 hearing are barred by the
doctrine of res judicata. As with the claim for additional medical bills, the claims for
travel, lodging, and per diem expenses were not adjudicated at the time of the initial
hearing. Therefore, these claims are not barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and
since they are not otherwise contested by Employer/Surety, Claimant is entitled to be
reimbursed for these expenses as well (R., Vol. III, p. 432, LL 3-15).
Employer filed a Motion To Reconsider on 10.17.12 and converted its pre-hearing res

judicata argument into a 2-page collateral estoppel argument at pp.

reverse

Commission's use

collateral estoppel

Court
not meet its

case:
against
to litigate
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the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the
issue sought to be precluded was actually decided
the prior litigation; (4) there
merits in the prior litigation; and
party against
was a final judgment on
whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation.
Rodriguez, 136 Idaho at 92, 29 P.3d at 403. This Court finds that collateral estoppel
does not bar Royal's claim seeking apportionment of liability to ISIF for Stoddard's
total and permanent disability because the issues are not identical in the two cases.
Stoddardv. Hagadone Corp., 147 Idaho 186, 191, 207 P.3d 162, 167 (2009).
The Claimant filed a Motion For Reconsideration on 12.19.12 and asked the Industrial
Commission to reconsider its decision to apply collateral estoppel to the facts of this case (R.,
Vol. III, pp. 465-494), but the Commission summarily denied that motion on 1.2.13 without
discussion (R., Vol. III, pp. 504-505). The Court should reverse the Industrial Commission's
12.10.12 decision to apply collateral estoppel and 1.2.13 denial of Claimant's Motion For
Reconsideration for the following reasons:
1.

The Commission only listed res judicata and did not list collateral estoppel as a
disputed issue in its 3.17.12 Notice of Hearing as required by Idaho Code §72-713
(R., Vol. II, p. 259, LI. 6-11).

2.

The Commission and the parties discussed all of the disputed issues at the
commencement of the 5.17.12 Hearing and Employer explicitl)' agreed that res
judicata was the only affirmative defense being raised by Employer. There was no
mention of collateral estoppel (Tr. 2, p. 4, L. 16-p. 5, L.24).

3.

Based on the Notice of Hearing and agreement of the parties at the Hearing, the
Claimant only addressed the doctrine of res judicata and did not even mention
collateral estoppel at pages 25-27 of his 7.27.12 of his post-hearing brief.

res judicata and did not even mention collateral estoppel
24-25 of its 8.15.12 post-hearing
5.
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p. 429,
doctrine

19

p. 432,

15). The Industrial Commission
not even mention
collateral estoppel in its 9.28.12 decision I 12.5.12 amended decision.

6.

Based on that pre-hearing record, the Industrial Commission did not have substantial
and competent evidence to support its "belief that by raising the doctrine of res
judicata, Employer raised the issue of collateral estoppel as well" (R., Vol. III, p. 453,
Ll., 19-22).

7.

The Claimant did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate all past denied
medical benefits at the 9.28.10 Hearing (R., Vol. III, p. 473, L. l -p. 480, L. 23).

8.

The past denied medical benefit matters I issues litigated at the 9.28. l 0 Hearing were
not identical to the past denied medical benefit matters I issues litigated at the 5 .17.12
Hearing (R. Vol. III, p. 480, L. 24 - p. 490, L. 7). If the matter I issue was not
actually adjudicated at the prior hearing, collateral estoppel does not apply.
Wernecke, supra, 147 Idaho 277, 288, 207 P.3d 1008, 1019 (2009).

9.

This Court ruled in its 7.27.11 Order Dismissing Appeal (R., Vol. I, pp. 74-75) and
8.15.11 Order Denying Employer's Motion For Clarification (R., Vol. I, p. 76) that
the Commission's 5.17.11 Order was not a final and appealable Order to which the
doctrine of collateral estoppel could properly be applied. And,

10.

The Industrial Commission has held that in cases that involve multiple hearings
between the same parties, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply.
(Collateral estoppel is inapplicable in cases like this one where the litigation, albeit
including several different hearings, is nevertheless all part of the same case. Berisha
v. The Grove Hotel and Insurance Company of the West, 2012 WL 2118142, I.C.
2002-003038 (Filed: 5.30.12) (See ~13 on p. 13)).

For all of the foregoing reasons and those set forth in Claimant's 12.19.12 Motion For
Reconsideration, the Claimant asks this Court to reverse the Industrial Commission's 12.10.12
erroneous decision to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to allow Employer to avoid this
Court's holding
1 .
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When Employer raised res judicata as a disingenuous device to avoid its obligations under
Neel, the Claimant filed his 2.13.12 request to include the Idaho Code §72-719 "manifest

injustice" issue as a disputed issue to be heard and decided at the 5 .17 .12 Hearing and explained
the manifest injustice that would occur if Employer was allowed escape its obligations under
Idaho Code §72-432 and Neel by receiving an unearned credit for paying $27,451.27 in past
denied benefits that Employer never actually paid (R., Vol. II, p. 254-257) (See CL. 5.17.12 EX.
14, 15 and 16).
The Commission did not address the LC. §72-719 "manifest injustice" issue in its 12.5.12
amended decision or its 12.10.12 Order on Reconsideration. After receiving the Industrial
Commission's 12.10.12 Order On Reconsideration which applied the doctrine of collateral
estoppel for the first time, the Claimant filed a Motion For Reconsideration on 12.19.12 and

again asked the Commission to exercise its authority under LC. §72-719 to prevent the manifest
injustice that would occur if Employer was given an unearned credit for paying the past denied
benefits listed in Claimant's 5.17.12 EX. 14, 15 and 16. (R., Vol. III, p. 479 L. 18 - p. 480,
L.19).
The Commission could have easily exercised its authority under Idaho Code §72-719 to
correct manifest injustice by making a simple change to the language of its 5 .17 .11 Order:
Employer is
to pay 100% of the
benefits incurred by Claimant from the
date when
Commission deemed
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Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 306, 179

Page v.

3d 265, 269 (2008) (Page

Industrial Commission's refusal to correct a manifest injustice
Commission based its date of medical stability finding on a medical opinion which lacked a
proper foundation.

basing a stability finding on a medical opinion that lacked proper

foundation is a proper basis for appellate review to correct manifest injustice, the Court should
reverse the Commission's refusal to correct the manifest injustice that will occur if Employer is
rewarded for denying this claim and receives a unearned credit for the payment of all past
medical benefits listed in CL. 5.17.12 EX. 14, 15 and 16 ($27,451.27) when Employer never
actually paid those benefits.
The Commission's ruling not only violates this Court's holding in Neel, it is antithetical to
the policies of sure and certain relief and the attainment of justice which underlie the Workers'
Compensation Act:
"Since the inception of Idaho's Workers' Compensation Act, Industrial Commission
proceedings have been informal and designed for simplicity; the primary purpose of
these proceedings being the attainment of justice in each individual case." Hagler v.
Micron Technology, Inc., 118 Idaho 596, 599, 798 P.2d 55, 58 (1990). Industrial
Commission proceedings should be simple, accommodating to claimants, and above
all seek justice. Id. "[T]he Commission has historically been imbued with certain
powers that specifically enable it to simplify proceedings and enhance the likelihood
of equitable and just results." Id.
When a claimant has failed or overlooked submitting evidence to establish the
amount of
to which he is entitled, and there is no question but
is entitled to
then it is the duty of
Board to call attention to
failure
whatever evidence is available to establish such fact is
Watkins v. Cavanagh, 61
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under Idaho

Commission's refusal to exercise its

Court should :reverse

Code §72-719 and correct this manifest injustice.
12.

THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECISION
IN THIS "CLOSE CASE" TO ONLY A WARD ATTORNEY'S FEES BASED ON
EMPLOYER'S UNREASONABLE REFUSAL TO PAY CLAIMANT HIS
STAGE OF THIS CLAIM
Employer denied this claim without any reasonable factual or legal reason. When asked

to explain its denial, Employer refused to offer any facts that would explain why the premises
presumption did not apply and refused to explain why it would not follow this Court's holding in

Stevens - lvfcAtee v. Potlatch Corp., 145 Idaho 325, 179 P.3d 288 (2008) and resolve all doubts
over whether the Claimant's injury arose out of employment in the Claimant's favor (CL.
5.17.12 EX. 9, 009006).
The Industrial Commission held that this was "a dose case", but refused to award
Claimant attorney's fees on the following 4 grounds:

1.
2.
3.
4.

Shoe tying is a common occurrence;
Idaho does not have any bright line in the case law regarding when an accident arises out
of employment;
Idaho does not have any boot lace tying cases; and,
The scope and reach of this Court's holding in Spivey is the subject of legitimate debate
52, L. 3).
(R., Vol. I, p. 51, Ll. 21
The

to

1st

ground is a non sequitur. Whether shoe tying is a common occurrence is irrelevant

attorney's

question. Operation of a motor

not mean

a

at

is a common occurrence.
a motor

his

not
occurrence.
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that

lllJUry

not arise out of employment.

Commission's logic does not justify a denial

of Claimant's request for attorney's fees.
The

2nd

ground is based on a misunderstandings of this Court's holdings. Idaho does

have a bright line of cases which define when an injury "arises out of' employment. If the
injury happens on the Employer's premises, it is presumed to arise out of employment (See

Kessler and Foust). If there is any doubt about whether the injury arose out of employment, that

doubt must be resolved in the Claimant's favor (See Dinius, Spivey, Page I and Stevensl'vfcAtee ). Where a causal connection exists between the circumstances under which the work
must be performed and the injury of which the claimant complains, the injury arose out of
employment (See Wynn, Gage, Spivey, Page I and Stevens-McAtee).
The Commission had to overlook the premises presumption, the rule that all doubts about
whether in injury arose out of employment must be resolved in the Claimant's favor and the
overwhelming evidence in this case that established a causal connection between the
requirements of the Claimant's job and the circumstances under which that job had to be
performed and his low back injury in order to rule against the Claimant on the attorney's fee
issue.
The

3rd

ground relied on

any boot tying cases.
to prove that

the Commission to deny fees was that Idaho does not have
Idaho Code §72-804 does not require the Claimant

Idaho

an "arise out

exact same
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s
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nature of the Employer's unreasonable conduct, not on
injury which will obviously change

case

to

injured worker's mechanism of

vicissitudes

The 4th ground relied on to deny an award of attorney's fees is that this Court's holding in
Spivey is still the subject of legitimate debate. The Claimant strongly disagrees with this

statement.

Since Spivey was decided in 2002, this Court has cited the Spivey holding with

approval in at least 8 different cases including, Konvalinka v. Bonneville County, 140 Idaho 4 77,
95 P.3d 628 (2004); Page v. AkCain Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 342, 109 P.3d 1084 (2005); Clark v.
Truss, 142 Idaho 404, 128 P. 3d 941 (2006); Hutton v. Manpower, Inc., 143 Idaho 573, 149 P.3d

848 (2006); Stevens-McAtee v. Potlatch Corp., 145 Idaho 325, 179 P.3d 288 (2008); Fife v.
Home Depot, Inc., 151 Idaho 509, 260 P .3d 1180 (2011 ); Henry v. Department of Correction,

Docket No. 39039 (Filed: 1.23.13) and Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., Docket No. 39337
(Filed: 4.26.13).
Whether Employer likes it or not, the Spivey Court's rejection of the "greater risk"
doctrine is the law of this state and Employer and the Industrial Commission have a duty to
properly apply this Court's holding in Spivey to the facts of each case:
Reyes invites us to overrule Nelson. We decline to do so. The
of stare
decisis dictates that we follow [controlling precedent], unless it is manifestly
wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling
it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued
v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803
978, 983
injustice. Houghland Farms,
(1990). Reyes v. Kit Mfg. Co., 131 Idaho 239, 240, 953
989,
(1998)
emphasis
not

Employer

was

to
a
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court's holdings in Foust, Kessler, Wynn, Gage, Spivey, Page I, Page
properly apply those holdings to

and Stevens-McAtee

facts of this case and accept this claim as

compensable.
Just because Employer chose this claim as a test case to convince the Court that it should
overrule its rejection of the "greater risk" doctrine in Spivey, that does not mean that the holding
in Spivey is the subject of legitimate debate. When the Industrial Commission accepted
Employer's invitation to review 80 years of "greater risk" case law and then euphemistically
labeled Employer's defiance of this Court's holdings as the subject of legitimate debate, the
Commission's undermined the bedrock principle of stare decisis. Employers should not be
allowed to willfully defy this Court's holdings and then whitewash their unreasonable conduct
by calling it the subject of reasonable debate.
Since the overwhelming weight of the evidence in the record proves that Employer's
denial was not based on reasonable factual or legal grounds, the Court should reverse the
Commission's 5.17.11 denial and award the Claimant attorney's fees on all benefits awarded in
its 5.17.11 compensability decision from date of injury on 12.18.09 to date of decision on
5.17.11 based on the percentages set forth in the Legal Services Contingency Fee Employment
Agreement between Claimant and Claimant's Counsel dated 1.19.10 (R., Vol. II, pp. 327-330).
Employer refused to
Commission's authority
its own
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out

and then
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briefing which ultimately resulted in the Commission's 12.8.11
should not

Denying Stay.

forced through Employer's unreasonable conduct to re-litigate

Employer's obligation to pay benefits when Employer's liability for those benefits has already
been established.
The 1st ground the Commission gave for denying attorney's fees in its 12.8.11 Order was
that Employer filed a Notice of Appeal with the Supreme Court (R., Vol. II, p. 212, LL 10-11).
Employer's decision to file a frivolous interlocutory appeal from the Commission's non-final
Order which clearly did not resolve all of the disputed issues in the case did not give Employer a
reasonable basis to refuse to comply with Orders from the Industrial Commission. This Court
should reverse the Commission's refusal to award the Claimant fees on this ground because the
Commission's finding did not as a matter of law support its denial of fees under Idaho Code §72804.
The Commission also denied the Claimant's request for fees because after the Supreme
Court dismissed Employer's 1st interlocutory appeal (which signaled the Court's intent to not
stay the proceedings before the Commission), the Employer just returned to the Commission and
asked the Commission to stay the enforcement of its own award (R., Vol. II, p. 212, LL 11-13).
Employer's decision to go back to the Commission and ask it to stay the enforcement of its own
Order after

Supreme Court

just
the

not engage

Employer's request for a stay by dismissing its
Commission's finding that
actions support

did

opposite
a
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Court had just denied Employer's request
Since

a stay by dismissing Employer's appeal.

Commission's finding did not support its denial of attorney's

as a matter of law,

this Court should reverse the Commission's denial of attorney's fees in its 12.8.11 Order.
In its 12.5.10 Order, the Commission ordered Employer to pay attorney's fees on all
benefits that it unreasonably refused to pay after this Court dismissed Employer's Motion For
Permissive Appeal on 1.30.12 including, past denied medical benefits listed in CL.5.17.12 EX.
14 and 15, past denied mileage, per diem and lodging expenses listed in CL. 5.17.12 EX. 16 and
the undisputed 12% PPI rating that Dr. Frizzell issued on or about 3.10.11 (R., Vol. II, p. 315, LI.
20-23) (See Claimant's demand for payment of these benefits in CL. 5.17.12 EX. 17).
When the Commission entered its 12.10.12 Order on Reconsideration, it erroneously
applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to give Employer an unearned credit for the payment
of past denied medical benefits that Employer had never actually paid and limited the Claimant's
award of attorney's fees to Employer's unreasonable refusal to pay the undisputed 12% PPI
based on the undisputed 12% PPI rating that Dr. Frizzell had issued on 3.10.11 (R., Vol. III, p.
460, LI. 1-5).
This Court should reverse the Commission's erroneous misapplication of collateral

estoppel and Order Employer to pay attorney's fees in accordance with the percentages set forth
Legal Services Contingency

m

330)

on

Employment

that Employer unreasonably refused to

pp. 327-
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to:

1.

5.17. 2
5. 7.12

2.
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issued on 3.1

16 of
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The Claimant repeatedly asked Employer to pay all worker's compensation benefits that
Claimant was entitled to receive in this compensable claim under the Idaho Workers'
Compensation Act. Employer responded to Claimant's multiple requests for the payment of
benefits and made it clear that Employer had absolutely no intention of making payment of

any benefits to Claimant until after the Idaho Supreme Court entered its final decision on
appeal which affirmed the Industrial Commission's 5.17.11 compensability decision (CL.
5.17.12 EX. 17, Bates No. 017010; 017021-017022).

The Commission explained by that

defense was umeasonable in its 12.8.11 decision and its 12.5.12 decision:
As noted above, the Commission's final order on the issue of compensability brings
with it an obligation to pay to Claimant those workers' compensation benefits to
which he would normally be entitled as a result of having suffered a compensable
accident/injury" (R., Vol. III, p. 435, LL 7-10).
What Employer/Surety has failed to understand, however, is that the Commission's
finding that the subject accident is compensable carries with it an obligation on the
part of Employer/Surety to pay to Claimant those workers' [sic][worker's]
compensation benefits to which he is entitled as a result of the accident. We find
nothing in the correspondence going back and forth between Claimant's counsel and
Defense Counsel which suggests that Employer/Surety at any time disputed the
claims for additional benefits to which Claimant believed he was entitled. The only
basis for denial was the aforementioned belief that Employer/Surety had no
obligation under the May 17, 2011 order to pay anything except those benefits which
were specifically addressed that
As explained
more
motion for stay, it is
on compensability
bifurcated matter. It is no
Claimant's
to
17, 20 2 hearing.
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particular benefit, Employer/Surety had an obligation to timely pay the same once
this claim had been found to
compensable under
workers' compensation laws
Code§ 72-304) (R.,
III, p. 8, LL 2-18).
this state.
Since Employer has "neglected or refused within a reasonable time after receipt of a
written claim for compensation to pay to the injured employee or his dependents the
compensation provided by law" in direct violation of Idaho Code §72-804, this Court should
award Claimant attorney's fees at every stage of the litigation from date of injury on 12.18.09 to
final decision on appeal and on remand to the Commission (See Stevens-,o/lcAtee v. Potlatch

Cmp., 145 Idaho 325, 179 P.3d 288 (2008)).
CONCLUSION
--The Claimant respectfully requests that this Court enter the following Orders on appeal:
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

6.
7.
8.

Claimant I

An Order affirming the Commission's 5.17.11 "arose out of' employment ruling and
award of past denied medical benefits and retroactive total temporary disability benefits;
An Order reversing the Commission's 5 .17 .11 decision that Employer came forward with
sufficient evidence to rebut the premises presumption;
An Order ruling that Claimant was entitled to a favorable ruling on the arose out
employment issue as a matter of law based on the proper application of the premises
presumption to the unique facts of this case because Employer only denied this claim on
the exclusive legal grounds that Claimant's accident and injury did not arise out of
employment;
An Order reversing the Commission's 5.17.11 decision to not award the Claimant
attorney's fees;
An Order instructing Employer that it had a duty to comply with the Industrial
Commission's Orders even if they were not final and appealable Orders and explaining the
consequences of its failure to
so;
An Order
Commission's 12.8.11 decision to not award the Claimant
attorney's fees;
Order
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11.

12.
13.

14.

15.

disability;
An Order affirming the Industrial Commission's 12.5.12 decision that quasi-estoppel
prevents Employer from shifting any liability for Claimant's total and permanent disability
to the ISIF;
An Order affirming the Industrial Commission's 12.5 .12 decision to award the Claimant
attorney's fees;
An Order reversing the Industrial Commission's 12.10.12 decision to use collateral
estoppel to give Employer an unearned credit for the payment of past denied benefits that
Employer never actually paid;
An Order reversing the Commission's 12.10.12 decision to use collateral estoppel to
limit its award of attorney's fees to Employer's umeasonable refusal to pay Claimant his
undisputed 12% PPI award; and
An Order awarding Claimant attorney's fees based on the percentages set forth in his
Legal Services Contingency Fee Employment Agreement at every stage of this litigation
from date of injury to date of final decision on appeal and on remand.

Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of May, 2013.
Ellsworth, Kallas, & DeFranco, PLLC

Attorney For Claimant I Respondent I Cross-Appellant
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